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Abstract 
Pereira, L.M., J.J. Alferes, J.N. Aparicio, Adding closed world assumptions to well-founded seman- 
tics, Theoretical Computer Science 122 (1994) 49-68. 
Given a program P we specify an enlargement of its well-founded model which gives meaning to the 
adding of closed world assumptions. We do so by proposing the desirable principles of a closed 
world assumption (CWA), and proceed to formally define and apply them to well-founded semantics 
(WFS), in order to obtain a WFS added with CWA, the O-semantics. After an introduction and 
motivating examples, there follow the presentation of the concepts required to formalize the model 
structure, the properties it enjoys, and the criteria and procedures which allow the precise character- 
ization of the preferred unique maximal model that gives the intended meaning to the O-semantics 
of a program, the O-model. Some properties are also exhibited that permit a more expedite 
obtention of the models. Several detailed examples are introduced throughout to illustrate the 
concepts and their application. Comparison is made with other work, and in the conclusions the 
novelty of the approach is brought out. 
1. Introduction and motivation 
Well-founded semantics [141 has been proposed as a suitable semantics for general 
logic programs. Its extended stable models (XSM) [12,13] version, and the inclusion 
of a second type of negation, have been explored as a framework for formalizing 
a variety of forms of nonmonotonic reasoning [ 10,l l] and generalized to deal with 
contradiction removal and counterfactuals [7-91. The increasing role of logic pro- 
gramming extensions as an encompassing framework for these and other AI topics is 
expounded at length in [4], where they argue, and we concur, that WFS is by design 
overly careful in deciding about the falsity of some atoms, leaving them undefined, and 
that a suitable form of CWA can be used to safely and indisputably assume false some 
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of the atoms absent from the well-founded model of a program. Consider the 
following example adapted from [3], itself a variant of the “game” example of [Z]. 
Example 1. Consider the program: 
win(X)cmoue(X, Y), -win(Y) 
raised-Bet(X)cwin(X) 
move@, a)c 
moue(b, c)c 
expressing that “X is a winning position if there is a move from X to Y and Y is not 
a winning position”, “’ m a winning position bets are raised”, and that “we can move 
from position a to position a, and from position b to c”. 
c is not a winning position since it is impossible to move from c. b is a winning 
position because it is possible to move from b to c and c is not a winning position. a is 
a position of draw. 
Neither win(a) nor -win(a) should hold. This is correctly handled by WFS which 
assigns the truth-value undefined to win(a). 
The semantics of this program should also capture the intended meaning that bets 
are not raised in a position of draw. This is not captured by WFS which leave 
raised-Bet(u) undefined. 
More abstractly, let P= (a+ --a; ecu}, where WFM(P)={ }. We argue that the 
intended meaning of the program may be i-c}, since a may not be true in any 
extended stable model of P, by the first rule, and so, the second rule cannot contradict 
the assigned meaning. Another way to understand this is that one may safely assume 
-c using a form of CWA on c, since -a may not be consistently assumed. 
However, when relying on the absence of present evidence about some atom A, we 
do not always want to assume that -A holds, since there may exist consistent 
assumptions allowing us to conclude A. Roughly, we want to define the notion of 
concluding for the truth of a negative literal -A just in case there is no hard or 
hypothetical evidence to the contrary, i.e. no consistent set of negative assumptions 
such that -A is untenable. 
Consider P = (a+ - b; bc -a; CCU]. If we interpret the meaning of this program as 
its WFM (which is empty), and as we do not have a, a nai’ve CWA could be tempted to 
derive WC based on the assumption -a. There is, however, an alternative negative 
assumption -b that, if made, defeats the assumption -a, i.e. the assumption -u may 
not be sustained since it can be defeated by the assumption-b. We will define the 
notions of sustainability and tenability more precisely later. 
Both programs above have empty well-founded models. We argue that WFS is too 
careful, and something more can safely be added to the meaning of the program, thus 
reducing the undefinedness of the program, if we are willing to adopt a suitable form 
of CWA. 
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We contend that a set CWA(P) of negative literals (assumptions) added to a pro- 
gram model MOD(P) by CWA must obey the four principles: 
(1) MUD(P)uCWA(P)+L for any ~LECWA(P). This says that the program 
model added with the set of assumptions identified by the CWA rule must be 
consistent. 
(2) There is no other set of assumptions A such that MOD(P)uA +L for some 
~LECWA(P) i.e. CWA(P) is sustainable. 
(3) CWA(P) must be unique. 
(4) CWA(P) must, additionally, by maximal. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present some basic 
definitions. In Section 3 we introduce some new definitions, capturing the concepts 
behind the semantics, accompanied by examples illustrating them. Models are defined 
and organized into a lattice, and the class of sustainable A-models is identified. In 
Section 5 we define the O-semantics of a program P based on the class of maximal 
sustainable tenable A-models. A unique model is singled out as the O-model of P. 
Afterwards we present some properties of the class of A-models. Finally, we relate to 
other semantics and present conclusions. 
2. Language 
Here we give basic definitions and establish notation [6]. A program is a set of rules 
of the form 
HeBr ,..., B,, -Cr ,..., -C, (n>O,m>O) 
or equivalently 
where -{AI,..., A,} is a shorthand for { -Ai, . . . , -A,}, and -C is short for 
-(Ci ,..., C,>; H,B, and Cj are atoms. 
The Herbrand base B(P) of a program P is defined as usual as the set of all ground 
atoms. An interpretation I of P is denoted by Tu -F, where T and F are disjoint 
subsets of B(P). Atoms in Tare said to be true in I, atoms in F false in I, and atoms in 
B(P)-(TuF) undejined in I. 
In an interpretation Tu -F a conjunction of literals {B,, . . . , B,} u -{Cl,. . . , C,} 
is true iff {B, ,..., B,} G T and (C, ,..., C,}cF, false iff {B, ,..., B,}nF#@ or 
{C 1,. , . , C,} n Tf 0, and undefined iff it is neither true nor false. 
3. Adding negative assumptions to a program 
Here we show how to consistently add negative assumptions to a program P. 
Informally, it is consistent to add a negative assumption to P if the assumption atom is 
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not among the consequences P after adding the assumption. We also define when a set 
of negative assumptions is defeated by another, and show how the models of a pro- 
gram, for different sets of negative assumptions added to it, are organized into 
a lattice. 
We begin by defining what it means to add assumptions to a program. This is 
achieved by substituting true for the assumptions, and false for their atoms, in the 
body of all rules. 
Definition 3.1 (P + A). The program P + A obtained by adding to a program P a set of 
negative assumptions A G -B(P) is the result of 
l deleting all rules H+{B1,...,B,}u -C from P such that some -BiEA, 
l deleting from the remaining rules all -LEA. 
Definition 3.2 (Assumption model). An assumption model of a program P, or A-model 
for short, is a pair (A; M ), where A E -B(P) and M = WFM (P + A). 
Among these models we define the partial order <, in the following way: 
(A,; MI ) 6, (AZ; M,) iff A, G AZ. On the basis of set union and set intersection 
among the sets A of negative assumptions, the set of all A-models becomes organized 
as a complete lattice. 
Having defined assumption models we next consider their consistency. According 
to the CWA principles above, an assumption -A cannot be added to a program 
P if by doing so A is itself a consequence of P, or some other assumption is 
contradicted. 
Definition 3.3 (Consistent A-model). An A-model (A; M ) is consistent iff Au M is an 
interpretation, i.e. there exists no assumption -LEA such that LEM. 
Example 2. Let P be 
cc-b 
bt -a 
at -a. 
whose WFM is empty. The A-model ((-a}; (a, b, WC}) is inconsistent since by 
adding the assumption -a then aE WFM(P+ { -a}). The same happens with all 
A-models containing the assumption --a. The A-model ({-b, -c}; (c]) is also 
inconsistent. Thus the only consistent A-models are ( { }; ( >), (1-b); {c} ) and 
<I-c);{ 1). 
Lemma 3.4. Zf an A-model AM is inconsistent then any A-model AM’ such that 
AM <, AM’ is inconsistent. 
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Proof. We prove that for all -~‘EB(P), if (A; WFM(P+A)) is inconsistent then 
(Au{-a’}; WFM(P+(Au{~u’ }))) is also inconsistent. By definition of inconsist- 
ent A-model: 3 -SEA 1 bE WFM (P+ A), so it suffices to guarantee that 
b$WFM(P+(Au(-a’})) =s u’EWFM(P+(AU{~Z’})). 
Consider b$ WFM(P+ Au (~a’}). Since b is true in P+A, and since 
P + (A u { -a’}) only differs from P + A in rules with a’ or -a’ in the body, it follows 
that there is a support set SSP+A (b) containing a’ (in the appendix we recall the 
definition of support set introduced in [7]), and thus, by definition of support set, a’ is 
also true in P+A. 
Since U’E WFM (P+ A), by Propositions A.1 and A.2 there is a support set 
SSp+A(u’) such that u’$SS,+~(U’) and -u’$SS,+~(U’). As the addition of -a’ to PS A 
only changes rules with mu’ or a’, then 
Rules(SSp+.(a’))EP+(Au{-u’})cP+A 
and by Proposition A.3 U’E WFM(P+(Au{ -a’})). 0 
According to the CWA principles above, an assumption -A cannot be sustained if 
there is some set of consistent assumptions that concludes A. We have already 
expressed the notion of consistency being used. To capture the notion of sustainability 
we now formally define how an A-model can defeat another, and define sustainable 
A-models as the nondefeated consistent ones. 
Definition 3.5 (Defeating). A consistent A-model (A; M) is defeated by a consistent 
(A’;M’) iff !l*urzA(uEM’. 
Definition 3.6 (Sustainable A-models). An A-model (A; M) is sustainable iff it is 
consistent and not defeated by any consistent A-model. Equivalently (-S; M) is 
sustainable iff: 
Example 3. The only sustainable models in Example 2 are ( { }; ( ) ) and ( ( -b}; 
(c} ). Note that the consistent A-model ( { NC}; { } ) is defeated by ( { -b}; (c) ), i.e. 
the assumption -c is unsustainable since there is a set of consistent assumptions 
(namely i-b)) that leads to conclusion c. 
The assumptions part of maximal sustainable A-models of a program P are 
maximal sets of consistent CWA that can be safely added to the consequences of 
P without risking contradiction by other assumptions. 
Lemma 3.7. If an A-model AM is defeated by another A-model D, then all A-models 
AM’ such that AM <, AM ‘ are defeated by D. 
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Proof. If AM = (A; M ) is defeated by D = (AD; M,), then there exists dE MD such 
that -dEA. Since all AM’s are of the form AM’=(A’; M’), where A’=AuB then 
-dEA’, i.e. D defeats AM’. 0 
Lemma 3.8. The A-model ({ }; WFM(P)) is always sustainable. 
Proof. By definition of sustainable. 0 
Theorem 3.9. The set of all sustainable A-models of a program is nonempty. On the basis 
of set union and set intersection among their A sets, the A-models ordered by 6, form 
a lower semilattice. 
Proof. Follows directly from the above lemmas. 0 
A program may have several maximal sustainable A-models. 
Example 4. Let P be 
ce -c, -b 
b+a 
a+- --a. 
Its sustainable A-models are ( ( }; ( }), ( ( -b}; ( }) and ( { -c>; { }). The last 
two are maximal sustainable A-models. We cannot add both -b and -c to the 
program to obtain a sustainable A-model since ({-b, NC}; {c}) is inconsistent. 
4. The O-semantics 
This section is concerned with the problem of singling out, among all sustainable 
A-models of a program P, one that uniquely determines the meaning of P when the 
CWA is enforced. This is accomplished by means of a selection criterion that takes 
a lower semilattice of sustainable A-models and obtains a subsemilattice of it, by 
deleting A-models that in a well-defined sense are less preferable, i.e. the untenable ones. 
Sustainability of a consistent set of negative assumptions insists that there be no 
other consistent set that defeats it (i.e. there is no hypothetical evidence whose 
consequences contradict the sustained assumptions). Tenability requires that a maxi- 
mal sustainable set of assumptions should not be contradicted by the consequences of 
adding to it another competing (nondefeating and nondefeated) maximal sustainable 
set. 
The selection process is repeated and ends up with a complete lattice of sustainable 
A-models, which defines for every program P its O-semantics. The meaning of P is 
then specified by the greatest A-model of the semantics, its O-model. 
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To illustrate the problem of preference among maximal A-models we introduce an 
example. 
Example 5. Consider the program P: 
c+ -c, -b 
bta 
at -a, 
whose sustainable A-models are ({ }; { }), (C-b}; { }) and ({-c}; { }). Because 
we wish to maximize the number of negative assumptions, we consider the maximal 
A-models, which in this case are the last two. The join of these maximal A-models, 
((4 -c>;{c})>. P f 1s er orce inconsistent, in this case w.r.t. c. This means that when 
assuming -c there is an additional set of assumptions entailing c, making this 
A-model untenable. But the same does not apply to -b. Thus the preferred A-model is 
( ( -b}; ( } ), and the A-model ( ( WC}; ( > ) is said to be untenable. The rationale for 
the preference is grounded on the fact that the inconsistency of the join arises w.r.t. 
c but not w.r.t. b. 
Definition 4.1 (Candidate structure). A candidate structure CS of a program P is any 
subsemilattice of the lower semilattice of all sustainable A-models of P. 
Definition 4.2 (Untenable A-models). Let { (A 1 ; Ml ), . . , (A,; M, )} be the set of all 
maximal A-models in CS. Let J = ( AJ; MJ) be the join of all such A-models, in the 
complete lattice of all A-models. An A-model (A,; Mi) is untenable w.r.t. CS iff it is 
maximal in CS and there exists -aEAi such that UE MJ. 
Proposition 4.3. There exists no untenable A-model w.r.t. a CS with a single maximal 
element. 
Proof. Since the join coincides with the unique maximal A-model, which is sustain- 
able by definition of CS, then it cannot be untenable. 0 
The CS left after removing all untenable A-models of a CS may itself have several 
untenable elements, some of which might not be untenable A-models in the initial CS. 
If the removal of untenable A-models is performed repeatedly on the retained CS, 
a structure with no untenable models is eventually obtained, albeit the bottom 
element of the CSs. 
Definition 4.4 (Retained CS). The retained candidate structure R(CS) of a CS is 
defined recursively in the following way (where J is the join of elements of CS in the 
complete lattice of all A-models): 
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l J u CS if there are no untenable A-models in CS 
l Otherwise, let Unt be the set of all untenable A-models w.r.t. CS. Then 
R(CS)=R(CS-Unt) 
Definition 4.5 (The O-semantics). The O-semantics of a program P is defined by the 
R(CS) of the semilattice of all sustainable A-models of P. 
Let (A; M) be its maximal element. The intended meaning of P is Au M, the 
O-model of P. 
Remark 4.6. At this point, we are in a position to make an important remark. Our 
goal is to maximally reduce undefinedness of the well-founded model by adding to it 
negative assumptions. Now, the peeling process of subtracting only maximal unten- 
able A-models from CS ends up with an R(CS) with a maximal element. So we must 
guarantee that this element is always greater than or equal to the result we would 
obtain if we did not require untenable A-models to be maximal in Definition 4.2. 
This is indeed guaranteed, for the join of the maximal elements of each CS is always 
greater than any join of nonmaximal elements of that structure, and because the 
maximal element of the retained lattice is by definition one such join of maximal 
elements. 
Example 10 shows that if untenable A-models were not defined as maximal then 
a smaller O-model would be obtained. 
Theorem 4.7. The O-semantics of a program P is always dejined by a complete lattice of 
sustainable A-models. 
Proof. Since every CS is a semilattice of sustainable A-models, it is enough to prove 
that the join J= ( AJ; MJ) of the R(CS) CS of the semilattice of all sustainable 
A-models of P is a sustainable A-model. 
If we assume that J is inconsistent then at least one maximal A-model in CS is 
untenable. Accordingly, since in the final retained CS there are, by definition, no 
untenable A-models, J is consistent. 
J cannot be defeated by any other consistent A-model D because, in such a case, at 
least one other element of CS would also be defeated by D, which is impossible by 
definition of CS. 0 
Corollary 4.8. The O-semantics of a program has no untenable A-model w.r.t. itself. 
Proof. Follows directly from the theorem and Proposition 4.3. 0 
Corollary 4.9 (Existence of the O-semantics). The R(CS) of the semilattice of all 
sustainable A-models is nonempty. 
Proof. Follows directly from the theorem. 0 
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5. Examples 
In this section we display some examples and their O-semantics. Remark that 
indeed the O-models obtained express the safe CWAs compatible with the WFMs 
(which are all { 1). In Section 7, “Relation to other work” additional examples can be 
found which bring out the distinctness of O-semantics w.r.t. other semantics. 
Example 6. Let P be 
b+a 
cc-c, -b 
dcc. 
The semilattice of all sustainable A-models CS is shown in Fig. 1. 
The join of its maximal A-models is ({-b, -c, -d >; {c, -d} ). Consequently, the 
maximal A-model on the right is untenable since it contains -c in the assumptions, 
and c is a consequence of the join. So R(CS)= R(CS’), where CS’ is as in Fig. 2. 
The join of all maximal elements in CS’ is the same as before and the only untenable 
A-model is again the maximal one having -c in its assumptions. Thus 
R(CS) = R(CS”), where CS” is shown in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 1. Semilattice of sustainable A-models of Example 6. Tenable A-models are shadowed. 
Fig. 2. CS’ as explained in Example 6. 
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Fig. 3. R(CS) of Example 6. 
So the O-model is { -b, -d}. Note that if P is divided into P1 = (cc -c, -b; dcc} 
and P2 = {a+ -a; bca}, the O-models of P1 and P2 both agree on the only common 
literal -b. So -b rightly belongs to the O-models of P. 
Example 7. Let P be 
a+ -b 
bi- -c 
ct -a. 
Its only consistent A-models are ({ }; { }), ({-p}; {q) ) and ({ -4); { }). As 
this last one is defeated by the second, the only sustainable ones are the first 
two. Since only one is maximal, these two A-models determine the O-semantics, 
and the meaning of P is {-p, q}, its O-model. Note that if the three last rules, 
forming an “undejned loop”, are replaced by another “undefined loop” a+ -a, the 
O-model is the same. This is as it should, since the first two rules conclude nothing 
about a. 
Example 8. Let P be 
p-a, b 
a+ -b 
b+ -a. 
The A-models with -b in their assumptions defeat A-models with -a in their 
assumptions and vice versa. Thus the O-semantics is determined by ( { }; ( }) and 
({-p}; { } ), and the meaning of P is {-p}, its O-model. 
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Example 9. Consider the program P: 
C+- “C, -b 
b+ NC, -b 
b+-a 
a+- -a. 
Its sustainable A-models are ( { }; { }), ({-b}; { }) and (i-c}; { }). The join of 
the two maximal ones is ({-b, WC}; {b, c> ), and so both are untenable. Thus the 
R(CS) has the single element (( }; { }) and the meaning of P is { }. 
Example 10. Consider the program P: 
ct -a, WC 
ct -b, NC 
a+- -b, NC 
a+-d 
btd 
ctd 
d+ -d. 
The semilattice of all sustainable A-models CS is as in Fig. 4. 
The join of its maximal A-models is ({-a, -b, WC}; {a, c}). Consequently, all 
maximal A-models are untenable. So R(CS)= R(CS’), where CS’ is shown in Fig. 5. 
Fig. 4. Semilattice of sustainable A-models of Example 10 
Fig. 5. CS’ as explained in Example 10. 
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Fig. 6. The O-semantics of Example 10. 
Fig. 7. Retained CS of Example 10, if untenable A-models were not defined as maximal ones. 
Since the join of all elements is ({--a, -b}; { }), there are no untenables in CS’. 
Thus the O-semantics is as depicted in Fig. 6 and the O-model is { ~a, -b). 
If untenable A-models were not defined as maximal ones (cf. Remark 4.6), then 
({-a}; { }) would also be untenable w.r.t. to the semilattice of all sustainable 
A-models CS. Then the R(CS) would be as presented in Fig. 7, and the O-model 
would be smaller: i-b}. 
6. Properties of sustainable A-models 
This section explores properties of sustainable A-models that provide a better 
understanding of them, and also give hints for their construction without having to 
previously calculate all A-models. 
We begin with properties that show how our models can be viewed as an extension 
to WFS. As mentioned in [6], negation in WFS is based on the notion of support, i.e. 
a literal -L only belongs to an XSM if all the rules for L (if any) have false bodies in 
the XSM. In contradistinction, we are interested in negations as consistent hypotheses 
that cannot be defeated. To that end we weaken the necessary (but not sufficient) 
conditions for a negative literal to belong to a model as explained below. We still want 
to keep the necessary and sufficient conditions of support for positive literals. More 
precisely, we know that XSMs must obey, among others, the following conditions (cf. 
WI ): 
l If there exists a rule ptB in the program such that B is true in model M then p is 
also true in M (suficiency of support for positive literals). 
Adding closed world assumptions to well-founded semantics 61 
l If an atom REM then there exists a rule ptB in the program such that B is true in 
M (necessity of support for positive literals). 
l If all rule bodies for p are false in M then -PE M (suficiency ofsupportfor negative 
literals). 
l If -REM then all rules for p have false bodies in M (necessity ofsupportfor negative 
literals). 
Our consistent A-models, when understood as the union of their pair of elements, 
assumptions A and WFM(P+A), need not obey the fourth condition. Foregoing it 
condones making negative assumptions. In our models an atom might be false even if 
it has a rule whose body is undefined. Thus, only false atoms with an undefined rule 
body are candidates for having their negation added to the WFM(P). 
Proposition 6.1. Let (A; M ) be any consistent A-model of a program P. The interpreta- 
tion Au M obeys the first three conditions above. 
Proof. Here we prove the satisfaction of the first condition. The remaining proofs are 
along the same lines. If 
3pcb, ,..., b,, -cl ,..., -c~EPI {b, ,..., b,, -cl ,..., -cm} c AuM, then 
b,~M (l<idn) and -cjEM or -cjEA (1 <j <m). 
Let pcbI, . . . . b,, -cl, . . . . -ck (12 1, k <m) be the rule obtained from an existing one 
by removing all “CjE A, which is, by definition, a rule of P + A. Thus there exists a rule 
ptB in P + A such that B c WFM (P + A) = M. Given that the WFM of any program 
must obey the first condition above, PE WFM(P+ A). 0 
Next we state properties useful for more directly finding the sustainable A-models. 
Proposition 6.2. There exists no consistent A-model (A; M > of P with { -a} c A such 
that aE WFM(P). 
Proof. We begin by proving the proposition for {-a} = A. 
Since aE WFM (P), then by Propositions A. 1 and A.2 there is a SS,(a) = S such that 
a$S and -a#S and, consequently, 
Rules(S) E P + { -a}. 
Then, by Proposition A.3, aE WFM(P+ { -a}), and thus ({-a}; WFM(P+ { -a})) 
is inconsistent. 
It follows, from Lemma 3.4, that all A-models (A; M) such that {-a} G A are 
inconsistent. 0 
Hence, A-models not obeying the above restriction are not worth considering as 
sustainable. 
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Proposition 6.3. If a negative literal ALE WFM(P) then there is no consistent A-model 
(A; M) of P such that LEM. 
Proof. We prove that if LE M for a given A-model (A; M ) of P then (A; M ) is 
inconsistent. If LEM there must exist a rule Lc B, -C in P such that Bu -C G Mu A 
and Bu -C is false in WFM(P), i.e. there must exist L+B, -C in P with at least one 
body literal true in M u A and false in WFM (P). If that literal is an element of -C, by 
Proposition 6.2 (A; M ) is inconsistent (its corresponding atom is true in WFM (P) 
and false in M u A). If it is an element of B this theorem applies recursively, ending up 
in a rule with empty body, an atom with no rules or a loop without an interposing -1. 
As shown below the truth value of literals in these conditions can never be changed: 
Since the P + A operation only involves deleting rules with literals at the body and 
literals from the body of rules, the truth value of atoms without rules is always false no 
matter which A is being considered, and the truth value of atoms with a fact is always 
true. Literals in a loop without interposing -1 are false in P, and remain false if rules of 
the loop are deleted. 0 
Theorem 6.4. If ALE WFM(P) then ALE M in every consistent A-model (A; M ) of P. 
Proof. Given Proposition 6.3, it suffices to prove that L is not undefined in any 
consistent A-model of P. The proof is along the lines of that of the proposition 
above. 0 
Consequently, all negative literals in the WFM(P) belong to every sustainable 
A-model. 
Lemma 6.5. Let WFM(P)= Tu -F. For any subset S of -F 
WFM(P)= WFM(P+S). 
Proof. This lemma is easily shown using the definition of P + A and the properties of 
the WFM. 0 
Theorem 6.6. Let WFM(P)= Tu -F and (A; WFM(P+ A)) be a consistent A- 
model, and let A’= An -F. Then 
WFM(P+ A)= WFM(P+(A-A’)). 
Proof. Let P’=P+(A-A’) and WFM(P)=Tu-F. 
By Theorem 6.4 -F c WFM(P’). So, by Lemma 6.5, 
WFM(P’)= WFM(P’+ -F)= WFM([P+(A-(An -F))]+ -F). 
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BydefinitionofP+A,itfollowsthat(P+Al)+A2=P+(A,uA,).Thus WFM(P’)is 
WFM(P+[@-(An -F))u -F])= WFM(P+A). 0 
Note: This theorem shows that sets of assumptions including negative literals of 
WFM(P) are not worth considering since there exist smaller sets having exactly the 
same consequences Au M and, by Proposition 6.3, the larger sets are not defeatable 
by reason of negative literals from the WFM (P). Hence, in the remainder of the paper, 
we consider only A-models whose assumptions are not in the WFM, inasmuch all 
WFM(P) assumptions will be part of WFM(P+ A) for any A. 
Another important hint for calculating the sustainable A-models is given by 
Lemma 3.4. According to it one should start by calculating A-models with smaller 
assumption sets, so that when an inconsistent A-model is found, by the lemma, sets of 
assumptions containing it are unworthy of consideration. 
Example 11. Let P be 
p+- -LI, -b 
ace. d 
c+ -c 
d. 
The least A-model is ({ }; {d, -b}), where {d, -b}= WFM(P). Thus sets of 
assumptions containing -d or -b are not worth considering. Now take, for example, 
the consistent A-model ((-a}; (d, -b,p}), which we retain. Consider (t-c}; 
{ c, a, -p> ); as this A-model is inconsistent we do not retain it nor consider any other 
A-models with assumption sets containing WC. Now we are left with just two more 
A-models worth considering: ({-p}; {d, -b}) which is defeated by ({-a>; 
(d, -b, P} >; and ( { -P, -a}; {d, -b,p}) w lc IS inconsistent. Thus the only two h’ h . 
sustainable A-models are ({ }; {d, -b}) and ((-a}; {d, -b, p}). In this case, the 
latter is the single maximal sustainable A-model, and thus uniquely determines the 
intended meaning of P to be Au M = { -a, d, -b, p}. 
7. Relation to other work 
Consider the following program P: 
p+q, -r, -s 
q+r, -P 
r+p, -4 
S+ -p, -4, -r. 
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In [12] it is argued that the intended semantics of this program should be the 
interpretation {s, -p, -4, NY}, due to the mutual circularity of p, q, Y. This model is 
precisely the meaning assigned to the program by the O-semantics, its O-model. Note 
that WFS identifies the (3-valued) empty model as the meaning of the program. This is 
also the model provided by stable model semantics [2]. The weakly perfect model 
semantics for this program is undefined, as noted in [12]. 
The EWFS [l] is also an extension to the WFM based on the notion of GCWA [S]. 
Roughly, EWFS moves closer than the WFM (in the sense of being less undefined) to 
being the intersection of all minimal Herbrand models of P. With a different notation 
from that of [l]: 
EWFM(P) =&f WFM(P)uT(WFM(P))u -F(WFM(P)), 
where 
4 is a three-valued interpretation, and MrAJ_MOD(Y, P) is the collection of all 
minimal two-valued Herbrand models of P consistent with 4. For a set 9’ of 
interpretations, True(Y) (or False(Y)) denotes the set of all atoms which are true (or 
false) in all interpretations of Y. 
For the program P= {at -a>, we have 
WFM(P)= { >, 
MIN_MOD({ },P)=({u}} and EWFM(P)={u}. 
Note that this view identifies the intended meaning of rule at --a as the equivalent 
logic formula a+-1 a, i.e. a. The O-model of P is empty. 
The main differences between our approach and theirs are that 
l like WFS and unlike EWFM, we insist on the supportedness of positive literals, i.e. 
an atom A E MP iff 3AtBody ( Body E Mp, 
l unlike WFS and unlike EWFM, we relax, by allowing undefined bodies with false 
heads under certain conditions, the requirement of supportedness of negative 
literals, i.e. we relax 
-AEM, iff VAtBody 1 Body is false in Mp. 
Example 12. Let P be 
cc-b 
be --a 
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The O-model of P is (c, -b}. Note that c has a rule whose body is true in the O-model 
and it is not the case that all rules for b are false in it. 
The EWFM is {a,~, -b}. The atom a is true in the EWFM and has no rule with 
a body true in it. All rules for b have a false body in the EWFM. 
Another example where O-semantics differs from EWFM is the game example of 
the introduction. In this example EWFM gives the (strange) result that a is a winning 
position, and thus bets are raised. 
A similar approach based on the notion of stable negative hypotheses (built upon 
the notion of consistency) is introduced in [4], identifying a stable theory associated 
with a program P as a “sceptical” semantics for P, that always contains the well- 
founded model. 
One example showing that their approach is still conservative is 
Stable theories identify the empty set as the meaning of the program; however, its 
O-model is {-s}, since it is consistent, maximal, sustainable and tenable. Kakas and 
Mancarella (personal communication) have also obtained this model as a result of the 
investigation mentioned in the conclusions of [4]. In this recent work, instead of our 
notion of sustainable they present the following view: A is coherent if all sets of 
assumptions B that defeat A are defeated by A. That is if one insists on the set of 
assumptions A, no consistent evidence to the contrary can be found. No preferred 
unique model is identified in their approach. 
The differences between O-semantics and stable theories are along the same lines as 
the difference between WFS and stable models. 
Example 13. Consider program P: 
p+-a a+-b 
p+b bc-a 
p+-a, b. 
Here {-u} defeats {-b) and vice versa; { -4) is not defeated by any other; {-p} is 
defeated by {-b} and by {-a>. Thus the O-model is { -4). 
Both {-u} and {-b} are coherent. Thus they identify two models 
{Pf a, -b, -4) (P, b, --a, -4). 
Their intersection is (p, -4). 
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As in stable models [2], they envisage {a+- -b; bc -a} as aV b. This is not 
coherent because then we would expect the special case a+ wu to be construed as a, 
which they do not. 0 
8. Conclusions 
We identify the meaning of a program P as a suitable partial closure of the 
well-founded model of the program in the sense that it contains the well-founded 
model (and thus always exists). The extension we propose reduces undefinedness 
(which some authors argue is a desirable property) in the intended meaning of 
a program P, by an adequate form of CWA based on notions of consistency, 
sustainability and tenability with regard to alternative negative assumptions. Sus- 
tainability of a consistent set of negative assumptions insists that there be no other 
consistent set that defeats it (i.e. there is no hypothetical evidence whose consequences 
contradict the sustained assumptions). Tenability requires that a maximal sustainable 
set of assumptions should not be contradicted by the consequences of adding to it 
another competing (nondefeating and nondefeated) maximal sustainable set. 
Appendix. Support sets 
In this section we recall the definition and some properties of support sets, 
introduced in [7]. 
Definition A.1 (Support set). A support set of a literal L belonging to the WF model 
MP of a program P, represented as SS,(L), or SS(L) for short, is obtained as follows: 
0 If L is an atom: 
_ Choose some rule of P for L where all the literals in its body belong to Mp. One 
SS(L) is obtained by taking all those body literals plus the literals in some SS of 
each body literal. 
0 IfL=-A: 
_ If there are no rules for A in P then the only SS(L) is { }. 
- Otherwise, choose from each rule defined for A, a literal such that its complement 
belongs to Mp. A SS(L) has all those complement literals, and the literals of an SS of 
each of them. 
By considering all possible rules of P for a literal, all its SSs are obtained. 
Here we define Rules(SS,(L)) G P as the rules used in the definition above to build 
SS&). 
Proposition A.2 (Existence of support set). Every literal L belonging to the WF model 
of a program P has at least one support set SSp(L). 
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Since by definition every literal L with a support set SS,(L) belong to the WFM of 
P, we can say that a literal has at least one support set iff it belongs to the WFM. 
Other properties of support sets, which are used in some proofs of this paper, are 
presented below. 
Proposition A.3. For any atom A such that AE WFM(P), there is at least one support 
set S of A such that A$S and -Aq!S. 
Proposition A.4 Let P be a program, AE WFM(P) be an atom, and SS,(A) a support 
set of A. Then AE WFM (P’) for every program P’ such that 
Rules(SS,(A)) G P’ c P. 
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